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Abstract Contrary to natural born citizens, migrants can have a variety of legal
statuses depending on how they are classified by immigration law. Together, such legal
or ‘civic’ statuses constitute a system of civic stratification, from high (privileged) to
low (restricted). Recent scholarship highlights the relevance of immigration law for
understanding crime patterns. We analytically synthesize this literature and extend it
empirically by examining its usefulness in explaining the relationship between asylum
migrants’ civic statuses in The Netherlands and their chances of being registered as a
crime suspect. Logistic regression analyses were conducted using a unique dataset in
which comprehensive administrative data from various governmental sources were
combined. Four civic status groups were compared: naturalized citizens, residence
permit holders, asylum seekers in the procedure, and former asylum seekers whose
stay in the country had become unauthorized. The results suggest that strain theory and
more constructionist stances are required in order to understand the complex relation-
ship between civic stratification and crime. We discuss implications for other countries.
Introduction
Immigration law defines the degree to which different categories of international
migrants are incorporated into destination countries. As a consequence, and contrary
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to natural-born citizens, immigrants can have a variety of administrative or legal statuses
(hereafter called: ‘civic statuses’). Among asylum migrants, for example, we find
naturalized citizens, residence permit holders, those who are ‘in the procedure’ (i.e.,
have temporary legal stay without a residence permit), and unauthorized immigrants.
Each of these statuses affords, or denies, specific social, economic and political rights.
The term ‘civic stratification’ refers to such systems of differentiated rights [1–5].
Recent scholarship on immigration and crime highlights the significance of immigration
law for understanding crime patterns. Within this emerging approach there are two main
perspectives. The first views the differentiation of civic statuses as a potential ultimate cause
of differences in criminal behavior [6–12]. Here, the central assumption is that an individ-
ual’s civic status influences the degree to which (s)he is being exposed to social conditions
that produce, or prevent, offending. For instance, having amarginal civic statusmay result in
relative deprivation and strain, and may indirectly trigger certain forms of crime.
The second perspective does not attribute a causal role to civic status, but argues that
the possible relationship between civic status and crime is due to various forms of
social sorting in the allocation of civic statuses, and in the definition of what counts as a
crime [9, 11–19]. First, in the regulation of international migration there is a tendency to
channel migrants who are believed to represent a threat to public safety, including
migrants with a known or suspected criminal history, into the lower statuses, while the
higher statuses are reserved for migrants who are not believed to pose a risk to society.
Naturalization, for instance, often requires a (relatively) clean criminal record. Here,
differences in offending produce differences in civic status rather than the other way
around. Second, civil servants and immigration judges may, whether consciously or
not, contribute to a spurious relationship between civic status and crime by putting
certain categories of immigrants with greater chances of offending at a disadvantage
when making admission decisions. For example, young single males seem to have less
chance of obtaining an asylum residence permit than females and males in families,
because they are more likely to be seen as fortune seekers abusing the asylum
procedure [20]. A third form of selectivity, which is situated at the intersection of
immigration law and criminal law, is selective criminalization. States are increasingly
criminalizing migration-related behavior among ‘unwanted’ immigrants. In several
countries, for example, being an unauthorized immigrant is a crime in and of itself.
So far, the two perspectives have proved useful to explain crime patterns among
unauthorized immigrants. This article makes two main contributions: (1) it analytically
synthesizes the emerging literature, and (2) it extends it empirically by investigating
how a state’s regulation of international migration influences the crime patterns among
migrants with a wider number of civic statuses. In this article, we use administrative
and police data to study (registered) criminal activity among immigrants with a history
as asylum seeker. Asylum migrants constitute a strategic research group to study the
relationship between civic stratification and crime, as the asylum population is even
more differentiated with respect to civic status than other types of migrants. While other
migrants generally have to await the result of admission decisions outside of the state’s
territory before they being allowed to enter for any length of time, asylum seekers
already have legal stay, but few rights, while their application for an asylum residence
permit is being processed.
The analysis is based on a large and unique dataset on all first-generation immigrants
who applied for asylum in The Netherlands in the period 1995–2004. It was
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constructed in 2005 as part of a research project for the Dutch Police & Science
Program (see [21]). Two research questions guided the analysis: (1) Is there any
relationship between asylum migrants’ civic status in The Netherlands and their chance
of being registered as a crime suspect? (2) Can that relationship be explained by the two
perspectives outlined above?
In the next section, we elaborate the notion of civic stratification, and describe the
main civic statuses among asylum migrants in The Netherlands. Next, we conceptual-
ize the relationship between civic status and crime, and report the data sources, method
and findings. The concluding section discusses recent changes in Dutch immigration
policies and goes into the findings’ generalizability for other countries.
Civic stratification and the Dutch asylum procedure
The term ‘civic stratification’ has been coined by Lockwood [2], who raised the
question of whether the function of citizenship to promote social integration in the
polity – a central idea in Marshall’s sociology of rights – is threatened by tendencies
toward civic stratification, either because of inequality in de jure entitlement to rights or
in the de facto access to rights. In his view, civic stratification takes place along two
axes: (1) differences in citizenship rights and (2) differences in moral and material
resources. Four ideal-typical positions can therefore be identified. On top of the
hierarchy are those who have full rights and have the resources to access them (‘civic
gain’). At the bottom are those who are denied rights and lack the resources to
eventually expand them (‘civic exclusion’). In between, there are those who are
formally entitled to rights, yet who lack the resources to make use of them (‘civic
deficit’), and those who are not entitled to certain rights, yet who do possess the moral
and material resources to obtain them in the future (‘civic expansion’).
Migration researchers began using the concept in order to describe the complex
hierarchy of immigrants’ legal statuses [1, 3–5, 22]. Their focus has been on the formal
aspects of civic stratification, i.e., differential entitlement to rights. This is, for example,
how Morris ([3], p. 20–21) has applied the idea of differentiated membership in the
polity to asylum migrants:
BRecognized refugees are usually granted unlimited residence, while other
asylum seekers may receive humanitarian leave for a specified period. There
are also asylum seekers whose cases are pending and, finally, migrants
present in an unlawful status, having either crossed borders undetected or
exceeded their permitted period of stay. (...) Full refugee status carries with it
social rights, family reunification rights and access to the national, but not
the EU, labor market. (…) Asylum seekers whose status is pending are much
more precariously placed - they generally have reduced social rights and are
sometimes, it can be argued, denied their civil rights, if held in detention
until their case has been considered^.
Such tendencies toward stratification are assumed to be due to states trying to
manage conflicting interests (cf. Hollifield’s [23] ‘liberal paradox’). On the one hand,
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there is a need and willingness to incorporate certain categories of immigrants, includ-
ing ‘genuine’ refugees. Ideals of egalitarianism entail the idea that such newcomers
should, within a reasonable period of time, be treated as full and equal members of the
society, and a path to full citizenship is provided. On the other hand, the relative
openness of liberal societies creates strong tendencies to limit ‘unwanted’ migration,
and that goal is believed to be obtained, at least in part, by reducing such migrants’
access to labor markets and social provisions. Paying attention to civic stratification as a
relatively new aspect of social stratification has proven to be crucial for understanding a
host of phenomena in which social scientists take an interest, such as individual’s social
networks [24], second-generation educational outcomes [25], criminal proceedings
[26], and occupational status [27].
In this article, we use the term ‘civic status’ as a specific, i.e., to indicate that a
person has a particular civic status (such as: ‘naturalized citizen’), and as a generic, i.e.,
to indicate that in contemporary societies all individuals are attributed a legal status that
defines their formal membership in the nation. As a generic, civic status can be
conceptualized as an ordinal variable, i.e., as a variable with values that can be ordered
in terms of ‘high’ (privileged) and ‘low’ (restricted). The focus is on the four main
statuses among asylum migrants: (1) naturalized asylum migrants, (2) asylum migrants
with a residence permit, (3) asylum seekers in procedure, and (4) unauthorized
immigrants. By distinguishing four main statuses, we simplify to some extent; there
is actually some differentiation within these main statuses.1
The highest position in the Dutch civic hierarchy is occupied by admitted asylum
migrants who have become Dutch citizens through naturalization. They have full
social, economic and political rights, including full access to the labor market and
public provisions, such as public housing and welfare. Naturalization requires, among
other things, at least five years of consecutive legal stay on the basis of a residence
permit and – crucial for the present analysis – four consecutive years without having
been sentenced to incarceration, a community punishment or a major fine.2
The second position pertains to residence permit holders. They include those who
are recognized as a refugee in the sense of the Geneva Convention, who are given
subsidiary protection, or family members who receive what are called dependent
asylum permits. Asylum residence permit holders have, in principle, the same social
and economic rights as national citizens, but only build up political rights at the
municipal level. Compared to native citizens, many naturalized asylum migrants and
residence permit holders still live in relatively marginal conditions. A study on admitted
asylum migrants from Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Somalia showed that in 2009,
depending on the nationality, between 17.6% and 35.7% of the (potential) labor force
in these groups received welfare, against 1.6% among the native Dutch ([28], also see
[29]). Nevertheless, their average living standard – a regular welfare benefit is about
1 For example, rejected asylum seekers who cannot return to the country of citizenship due to their medical
condition may obtain a temporary residence permit that does not give a right to financial support or
accommodation, and no right to work. Likewise, some asylum seekers in the procedure no longer have legal
stay, because they may no longer await the final outcome of the procedure in The Netherlands. This occurs
when an asylum seeker is (i) appealing a rejection in what is called the fast track procedure, (ii) has lost an
appeal procedure and starts a higher appeal procedure, or (iii) submits a repeated asylum request after a
rejection (without mentioning ‘new facts’).
2 Rijkswet op het Nederlanderschap, Article 9.2.
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€1300 a month for a childless couple – was substantially higher than among those with
the two remaining civic statuses.
The third main civic status pertains to those who are ‘in the procedure’, meaning that
their case is under consideration. In principle, they can legally stay for the procedure’s
duration, but they have limited access to the formal labor market and education, and no
access to welfare. In the period on which this study focuses, those who were in the
procedure for at least six months could work in certain sectors for a maximum of
12 weeks a year. During the procedure, basic needs were provided for by the state in the
form of a ‘bed, water and bread’ arrangement, and a weekly allowance of € 55 per adult
(amount for 2005). Under-age children of those in procedure were entitled to free
education until their 18th birthday. Those aged 18 or older are entitled to enroll for a
study, but cannot receive state grants. There are no figures on labor participation among
asylum seekers, but it is assumed to be limited. Employers need to actively seek and
receive permission from the state to employ them, and asylum seekers tend to be
housed in rural areas with limited labor opportunities. Despite efforts to shorten asylum
procedures, a stay in an asylum center can last for years (also because of appeals to
negative decisions) (cf. [30]).
Fourth and finally, there are asylum migrants who have exhausted all legal remedies.
Once a final negative decision has been reached, asylum seekers are to leave the
country within four weeks. Those who stay, become unauthorized. They have no right
to work, are not allowed to rent housing, and, barring exceptions, have no access to
health services.3 Since the early 1990s, The Netherlands implemented various policies
to limit unauthorized immigrants’ de facto access to life chances. In 1991, it barred the
use of social security numbers for unauthorized immigrants, which severely limited
their opportunities to work. In 1994, the Compulsory Identification Act was introduced,
which stipulates that people must be able to identify themselves at a place of employ-
ment, in case of crimes and misdemeanors and whenever there is a ‘concrete suspicion’
(since 2001: ‘reasonable presumption’) of illegal residence. In 1998, the ‘Linking Act’
was implemented, which excludes unauthorized immigrants from a wide array of
public services, including welfare, public housing, education, and (most) health care.
The act requires government and semi-government services, such as welfare depart-
ments and housing associations, to check whether their clients are legal residents and
hence entitled to certain services or benefits. The national government also increasingly
allocated resources to enforce employer sanctions.
There is no doubt that unauthorized immigrants are at risk of an extremely
marginal position under this policy regime [8], but three main forces still moderate
the effects of the exclusionary measures. First, some local governments, churches
and NGOs organize poor-relief arrangements in the form of shelter and the
occasional provision of living allowances [31]. Women and families with children
in particular benefit from these arrangements. Second, some unauthorized mi-
grants receive support from more established immigrants, or from a native Dutch
partner. They, too, are under less pressure to turn to criminal offences [8, 32].
Third, some employment opportunities remain on the informal labor market, such
as domestic work [33], reducing the pressure to offend.
3 These exceptions are: education for minors, ‘medically necessary health care’, and legal representation.
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Conceptualizing the relationship with crime
Differential exposure to strain
The two perspectives sketched in the introduction conceptualize the relationship be-
tween civic status and crime differently. According to the first perspective, which we
propose to call the ‘behavioral perspective’, civic status may have an indirect effect on
crime (see Fig. 1a), as it determines, at least in part, the extent to which its holders are
exposed to, or protected from, social conditions that may generate criminal behavior.
A central assumption underlying the present analysis is that the relationship between
civic status and crime cannot be understood without paying attention to strain theory [34,
35]. Due to their privileged civic status, naturalized immigrants and residence permit holders
will, on average, experience less relative deprivation than asylum seekers in the procedure,
who in turn will experience less relative deprivation than those who have become unau-
thorized residents. As a consequence, the higher the civic status, the lower the probability of
people committing crimes because they lack the conventional means to realize positively
valued goals. A second reason to make this central assumption is provided by previous
research in The Netherlands, which already found suggestive empirical evidence for a
relationship between civic status and crime as a result of differential exposure to strain. For
instance, Althoff et al. [7], who conducted in-depth analyses of police files involving asylum
seekers, observed that criminal behavior often concerned petty theft (mostly shoplifting) and
drug use, and occasional violence against other asylum seekers in the asylum center. They
attribute these offences to the frustration that asylum seekers experience as a result of
prolonged relative poverty, insecurity about the asylum decision, and restrictions on
individual freedom that come with living in an asylum center. Studies on the unauthorized
population have similarly concluded that those lacking legal stay are at risk of committing
certain crimes in response to the strains of a highly marginal social position [8, 9, 17]. One
study specifically conducted repeated in-depth life course interviews with 26 (male)
unauthorized immigrants with a criminal record and a history as asylum seeker [32]. While
some men admitted to having police contacts in the country of origin, most claimed to have
become involved in crime during the asylum procedure, or after becoming unauthorized.
Most men did not commit ‘survival crime’ in the narrow sense - although several were
confronted with homelessness and then stole food. Yet, they were sometimes pressed into
committing certain crimes in order to meet conventional social standards in difficult living
conditions, such as the norm to have your own money and not depend on other people’s
support too much, to occasionally send money or goods to the family in the country of
origin, or to have money for crucial family events such as a wedding or the funeral of a
deceased parent. It mostly concerned non-violent, ‘innovative’ crimes [35], which were
primarily aimed at obtaining income and/or reducing deportation risks. Hence, most crimes
were classified as ‘residence crime’ (using false or borrowed papers to enter or leave the
country or to pass in-country ID checks) or ‘subsistence crime’ (shoplifting, car burglary,
occasional house burglary, using false or borrowed papers to obtain access to the formal
labor market, petty drug dealing). Additionally, a fewmen became involved in ‘drug-related
acquisitive crimes’ (drug dealing and property crimes to finance drug use). Problematic drug
use had often started during long asylum procedures or during illegal residence, usually in
conjunction with the strains of homelessness, and sometimes led to more serious forms of
offending, including frequent house burglary, in order to finance drug use.
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The ‘lower’ one’s civic status, the more one is at risk of deportation and/or immi-
gration detention in case of police contacts. These aspects of what it means to have a
restricted civic status potentially limit crime involvement (compare Abrego [36] on the
legal consciousness of first-generation unauthorized immigrants in the United States). In
The Netherlands, however, the effects of differential exposure to strain increasingly
began to outweigh the effects of differential exposure to formal social control. While the
Fig. 1 Conceptualizing the relationship between civic status and crime
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(estimated) suspect rate among unauthorized immigrants used to be lower than among
authorized immigrants, it eventually surpassed the suspect rate among first-generation
legal migrants, mostly as a result of an increase in ID fraud, property crime and drug
crimes [9, 17]. The interviews, too, demonstrate that although the men usually tried to
abstain from crime as much as possible, the forces that pressured them into certain
crimes were sometimes stronger than the forces discouraging offending.
Selective status allocation and criminalization
The second perspective, which we propose to call the social constructionism perspec-
tive, holds that the relationship between civic status and crime is mainly the result of
social sorting and selective criminalization by the state. The state allocates civic
statuses in such ways that those who (are believed to) have elevated risks of committing
crimes have the highest chances of finding themselves at the bottom of the civic
hierarchy. Furthermore, the behavior of those with an unprivileged civic status is most
likely to be defined as ‘criminal’. Three related mechanisms may play a role.
First, there is an explicit tendency in immigration law to prevent ‘criminal’migrants from
obtaining, or keeping, the higher civic statuses (hereafter called: ‘manifest selective status
allocation’). This implies a kind of reverse causation, as real or perceived differences in past
offending lead to differences in civic status rather than the other way around (see Fig. 1b).
For example, article 1F of the Geneva Convention stipulates that ‘the provisions of the
Convention shall not apply to any person with respect to whom there are serious reasons for
considering that he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, a crime against
humanity, or has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge prior
to his admission to that country as a refugee’. Immigration law furthermore allows for
crimes committed in The Netherlands to be treated as a contraindication for granting
asylum.4 Moreover, in The Netherlands, all admitted asylum seekers are initially given a
residence permit for five years. If the holder is sentenced for certain crimes, the permit can
be withdrawn. Naturalization requires a (relatively) clean record of offences for four years.
Second, even when the screening and exclusion of ‘criminals’ is not an explicit
goal of status allocation decisions, persons with characteristics that make
offending more likely may have higher chances of being rejected (hereafter called:
‘latent selective status allocation’). For example, Mascini and Van Bochove [20]
show that male and single claimants have lower success rates in the Dutch asylum
procedure, which they attribute to stereotyping in admission decisions: ‘although
single male applicants may be seen as the prototypical political refugee, they also
match the image of a criminal or a Bbogus^ refugee’ ([20], p. 119). Similar gender
and age effects have recently been found in asylum admission decisions in Europe
at large [37]. Such forms of social sorting may promote a spurious relationship
between civic status and crime, as unaccompanied males, who have elevated
chances of ending up in a disadvantaged civic status, are more likely to commit
crimes than accompanied males and females (see Fig. 1c). The data allowed us to
control for the following migrant characteristics: family status, sex, age, and
country of origin. Such possible biases in admission decisions are consistent with
Lockwood’s notion of civic deficit, which was explained in the section ‘Civic
4 Vreemdelingenwet 2000, Article 31.2.
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Stratification and the Dutch Asylum Procedure’: rejected claimants may formally
have been entitled to a residence permit, but lacked the moral resources to access
their rights (‘they matched the image of a criminal or Bbogus^ refugee’). It may
also be that single claimants simply meet the admission requirements less often
than couples and families, in which case Lockwood’s category of ‘civic exclusion’
would be more appropriate.
Third, there may be a question of selective criminalization, which can be concep-
tualized as a kind of interaction effect (see Fig. 1d). Here, certain behavior – such as
continued stay in a country – only becomes defined as a crime for certain categories of
immigrants at the bottom of the civic hierarchy. In The Netherlands, illegal residence as
such is not a crime, but Dutch law makes it possible to declare certain categories of
migrants an ‘undesirable alien’. Continued stay then becomes illegal – undesirable
aliens are unauthorized immigrants by definition – and punishable as a public order
crime (with six months’ imprisonment for each violation). Naturalized citizens cannot
become undesired aliens, and the conditions under which such declarations are possible
are stricter for immigrants with legal stay than for unauthorized immigrants.5
Hypotheses
The following hypothesis is implied in both the first and second theoretical perspective:
H1. Among naturalized asylum migrants and residence permit holders, the docu-
mented crime rate is lower than among asylum migrants in the procedure, which in
turn is lower than the documented crime rate among those who have become
unauthorized immigrants.
According to the behavioral perspective, this is due to differential exposure to strain.
According to the social constructionist perspective this is due to selective status
allocation and criminalization. The following hypothesis is implied in the first perspec-
tive, but not the second:
H2. The relationship between, on the one hand, civic status and, on the other hand,
(a) property crime, (b) ID fraud and (c) drug offences is stronger than the
relationship between civic status and other crimes, such as violence.
The second perspective does not predict this relationship as selective status
allocation is, in principle, insensitive to the type of crime committed. Somebody
may obtain or keep a restricted civic status because of a property crime, as well as
for other crimes. We conceptualize ID fraud as a behavioral adaptation to strain;
unauthorized immigrants in particular are pressured into such offences in order to
pass as ‘legal’ during ID checks, or to obtain access to the labor market by
working with somebody else’s papers. We nonetheless recognize that there is an
5 Such resolutions require that the individual has committed a crime for which three or more years of
imprisonment can be imposed, has repeatedly committed less serious crimes, or has at least two apprehensions
for illegal residence. Since 2012, such resolutions have largely been replaced by ‘entry bans’ (see endnote 15).
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element of selective criminalization in such forms of fraud, and therefore also
conducted analyses for specific types of crimes to see whether the effects of civic
status on offending are mostly due to differences in ID fraud, or are broader.
The following three hypotheses are implied in the second perspective, but not the
first:
H3. Among naturalized asylum migrants, the documented crime rate is lower than
among residence permit holders.
Note that the first (behavioral) perspective does not predict this difference, as Dutch
law attaches similar social and economic rights to these two statuses. Furthermore, if
the association between civic status and crime is merely the result of manifest selective
status allocation and selective criminalization, one would expect that:
H4. The effects of civic status on crime disappear when we control for a dummy
indicating whether the asylum migrant been declared an ‘undesirable alien’ and/or
whether the asylum claim has been rejected, at least in part, because of public
safety considerations.
Finally, if the association between civic status and crime is merely due to latent
selective status allocation, we should find:
H5. The effects of civic status on crime disappear when migrant characteristics are
controlled that are both associated to civic status and to crime (including sex, age,
family status, and national origin).
Data and method
Data sources
The hypotheses were tested using a unique dataset that was constructed in 2005 as part
of a large research project for the Dutch Police & Science Program. Data from the
following four administrative sources were combined.
1. The Immigration and Naturalization Service Information System (INDIS)
This database contains data on all individuals who applied for asylum in
The Netherlands. An extract was made available that includes all persons who
(1) applied for asylum between 1995 (the first year for which reliable digital data
were available) up to and including 2004, and (2) were at least 12 years of age on
1 January 2005. A total of 235,424 migrants satisfied both criteria. Most analyses,
however, only pertain to those who applied for asylum before 2004 (N = 231,010),
as we are primarily interested in comparing individuals who were in the country
during the whole of 2004 and therefore had equal opportunity in terms of time, to
become a 2004 crime suspect. Additionally, by focusing on pre-2004 applicants it
is certain that the crimes followed the asylum application (the precise dates of the
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crimes were not made available), This prevents the suspect rate among asylum
seekers in the procedure and unauthorized migrants from being due to asylum
applications being submitted by crime suspects (it sometimes happens that unau-
thorized immigrants who come to the attention of the authorities, possibly as a
result of crimes, apply for asylum in order to avert or postpone deportation). The
data include information on the applicant’s age, sex, country of birth, and whether
or not the individual lived in a regular family in 2004.6 The data also indicate
whether or not the asylum request had been turned down, and whether this was (in
part) because of known or suspected crimes committed in the country of origin or
The Netherlands, and whether individuals had been declared an undesirable alien
at some point.
2. The Basis Service Aliens (BVV)
Information about the active civic status on 1 February 2005 of the 231,010
migrants who had applied for asylum in the years 1995 up to and including 2003
was obtained from BVV, a database in which the Dutch authorities register all
known non-citizens, which is continually updated with regard to changes in civic
status. It turned out that 105,986 persons who had applied for asylum before 2004,
had legal stay on 1 February 2005: 24,091 had become naturalized citizens,
49,093 had a valid residence permit, and 32,802 were still in the procedure (690
turned out to be deceased). The remainder (124,334) had exhausted all legal
means. They were considered unauthorized immigrants to the extent they were
still be in the country.
3. The Recognition Service System (HKS)
Information about offending was obtained from ‘HKS’, a system used by the
Dutch police to register suspects of felonies, i.e., relatively serious offences
punishable by at least 6 months of imprisonment. Crimes were categorized into
seven main categories: property crimes, ID fraud, violence (including sexual
violence), public order crimes, traffic crimes, drug crimes, and other crimes. In
the analysis, we only look at suspects of crimes committed in 2004.
What are called Vreemdelingennummers (‘Foreigner Identification Numbers’),
which the Dutch government uses to identify foreigners, were not being registered
in HKS, and we therefore had to devise other ways of matching asylum migrants
with crime suspects. As a first matching variable we used what are called ‘GBA
numbers’, i.e., identification numbers from the population register. These numbers
are normally registered in HKS and are given to all persons who register at the
municipality in the Register of Births, Deaths and Marriages. In The Netherlands,
registering with the municipality is possible for asylum seekers who have been in
the procedure for a number of months, and becomes mandatory for those
obtaining a residence permit. Unauthorized immigrants cannot register, but many
6 If the applicant was an adult, we checked whether there was at least one other adult with the same file
number present in INDIS; if the applicant was a minor, we checked whether there were at least two adults with
the same file number.
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possessed a GBA number from the period that they had legal stay. (We obtained
the appropriate GBA numbers from the BVV). If persons could not be matched on
the basis of their GBA number, we tried to identify them using what the Dutch
police call a ‘keno key’, which is a combination of letters and numbers from
identifiable variables such as date of birth, sex, name, and so on.7 The results were
randomly checked. Of all matches, 69% were matched on GBA number. As could
be expected, this percentage correlated with civic status, from 98% of the matches
among the naturalized immigrants down to 49% of the matches among those with
unauthorized status.8
4. The Aliens Administration System (VAS)
In order to calculate the percentage of unauthorized immigrants with an asylum
background suspected of a crime committed in 2004, we had to establish the
denominator by estimating the total number of individuals still residing in the
country during 2004 among the 124,334 individuals who had applied for asylum
before 2004 and no longer had legal stay by 1 February 2005. In The Netherlands,
estimations of the unauthorized population are based on the VAS (renamed PSH-
V), an administrative database documenting all apprehensions involving unautho-
rized immigrants. The apprehensions are for crimes but also for illegal labor,
illegal residence, and common misdemeanors. Statistically, if it is known how
many unauthorized immigrants were apprehended once, twice or more often in a
certain time span, it is possible to estimate how many migrants were apprehended
0 times; theoretically, the distribution of apprehensions then follows the shape of a
Poisson distribution (for a detailed explanation of this method and its assumptions,
see [38]). In 2002, 17,877 unauthorized migrants were apprehended, and it was
estimated that there were 212,000 undocumented migrants in The Netherlands in
that year ([39], p. 38–39). Thus, according to these estimations, the police
apprehended about one in twelve undocumented migrants present.
The estimate does not specify what share of the unauthorized population had a
background as asylum seeker. However, using the ‘foreigner identification num-
bers’, we counted the number of asylum seekers who had applied for asylum
before 2004, no longer had legal stay by 1 February 2005, and were apprehended
as unauthorized immigrant in 2002. This led to 2074 persons being matched.
Then, based on the assumption that one in twelve unauthorized migrants were
apprehended, we estimated the number of unauthorized asylum migrants who had
7 We used four different keys: (1) first four characters of the surname, followed by first character of the name,
and full date of birth, and (2) first four characters of the surname, followed by first character of the name and
year of birth, (3) first four characters of the surname, followed by first character of place of birth and full date
of birth, (4) first four characters of the surname, followed by first character of place of birth and year of birth.
We also matched on these keno keys after flipping surname and name.
8 Should the suspect rates at the bottom of the civic hierarchy be biased upwards due to many ‘false positives’
(as a consequence of different individuals happening to have the same key) there would be a risk of incorrectly
accepting hypothesis 1. However, we are quite confident that such a bias did not occur. For if the matching
procedure were to produce many false positives one would expect a significant number of naturalized migrants
being matched on keno number who were not being matched on GBA number. This was only the case for 13
out of 24,091 (0.05%) naturalized migrants.
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applied for asylum before 2004 and were still in the country in 2004 to be around
24,000 (2012 * 12 ≈ 24,000).9
Analytical strategy and descriptive statistics
After having combined the four data sources as described, we cross-tabulated the
number of crime suspects by civic status, specified by the seven crime types. Then,
multivariate analyses were conducted in the form of binary logistic regression in which
the dependent variable was whether one was suspected of a crime in 2004 or not. A
weighting variable was calculated so that the 124,334 migrants who applied for asylum
before 2004 and had exhausted all legal means by 1 February 2005 counted as 24,000
persons, i.e., the estimated number of unauthorized immigrants with an asylum back-
ground who were residing in The Netherlands in 2004.10 For lack of more specific
information, it was assumed that all non-apprehended migrants in this group had an
equal chance of residing illegally in The Netherlands in 2004.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the background variables used, specified
by civic status. Population categories with relatively high probabilities of offending
(males, singles, individuals in the age category 18–24 years or – to a lesser extent – 22-
44 years) turn out to be overrepresented in the lower status categories (‘in procedure’,
‘unauthorized’). North-Africans are similarly overrepresented at the bottom of the civic
hierarchy, while Asians are underrepresented. This may be due to regional differences
in the formal validity of asylum claims and formal entitlement to protection (compare
Lockwood’s ‘civic exclusion’), but it is also true that North Africans, more than other
ethnic minorities, constitute a low-status group in Dutch society, to which Dutch
inhabitants are relatively hostile and exclusionary (cf. [40]). North Africans – most
are first and second-generation Moroccans – are also overrepresented in Dutch crime
statistics, while Asians tend to be underrepresented, both in The Netherlands and
elsewhere (cf. [41]). Hence, there may also be a question of ‘civic deficit’, meaning
that North-African asylum seekers were less able to access their rights.
These systematic differences among civic statuses in terms of the demographic
characteristics mentioned suggest that status allocation indeed occurs in selective
ways that are likely to contribute to a higher suspect rate among those at the
bottom of the civic hierarchy. In the multivariate analyses these possible compo-
sition effects will be controlled.
Validity
Evidently, the estimate of the total unauthorized population with a background as
asylum seeker (N = 24,000) should be taken with some caution. However, we
could check its validity in two ways. Firstly, we calculated conservative suspect
rates for ‘recent’ unauthorized immigrants, namely who had applied for asylum in
9 Those applying for asylum in 2003 (N = 4274) could not be matched in this way. By using the figure of
24,000 we are assuming that the number of persons leaving the unauthorized population after 2002 was equal
to the number of persons entering it.
10 The 2136 unauthorized immigrants who were crime suspects in 2004 (see Table 2) counted as 1. All other
rejected asylum seekers (124,334–2136 = 124,009) counted for 0.176 ((24,000–2136)/124,009 ≈ 0.176) as we
could not assess whether or not they were in the country in 2004.
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2004 and had exhausted all legal remedies by February 2005 (N = 2139). For this
category, we simply divided the number of crime suspects (specified by month of
the asylum application) by the total number of individuals (specified by month of
the asylum application). In other words, we made the conservative assumption that
all these individuals, including those without police contacts, had been in the
country throughout 2004 as unauthorized immigrants (even if they all had legal
stay as asylum seeker for at least part of the year and even if part of them will
have entered midway 2004 and/or left the country before January 2005). A
comparison between these conservative suspect rates and the estimated suspect
rate for the category of unauthorized migrants indicated that the population
estimate is unlikely to be highly off the mark, and may actually be too high,
thereby reducing the chances of an incorrect acceptance of hypothesis 1 (see the
next section for details). Secondly, the estimate was compared to an amnesty
program for unauthorized migrants with a background as asylum seeker, which
was carried out in 2008. As part of that program, 24,377 rejected asylum seekers
(ages 10 and older) were regularized [42], indicating that the estimate is unlikely
to be highly inaccurate.
Some caution is also in order when interpreting police data as an indicator of
crime involvement. Police data is incomplete (there is a substantial ‘dark number’)
and sensitive to certain biases, which may include ethnic selectivity among police.
Table 1 Migrant characteristics by civic status. Pre-2004 applicants
Naturalized
(N = 24,091)
Residence Permit
(N = 48,931)
In procedure
(N = 32,778)
Unauthorized
(N = 24,000)
Sex:
Male 59% 61% 63% 73%
Female 41% 39% 37% 27%
Age:
12–17 yrs. 16% 13% 14% 7%
18–24 yrs. 19% 26% 29% 23%
25–44 yrs. 49% 46% 47% 60%
45+ yrs. 16% 15% 11% 10%
Family status:
With partner or two parents 43% 34% 29% 21%
Single applicant or with one parent 57% 46% 71% 79%
Region of origina:
Asia 67% 49% 39% 39%
Eastern Europe 14% 22% 25% 27%
North Africa 1% 1% 1% 4%
Africa other 18% 28% 35% 31%
a Individuals from other regions (Western Europe, Latin America, et cetera) were excluded because of low
numbers
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Dutch criminologists agree that factors such as age structure, socio-economic
deprivation, low informal social control and—in more controversial readings—
cultural factors are primarily responsible for the substantial overrepresentation of
certain ethnic minorities in crime, not ethnic selectivity among police (for an
overview see, [8]). There are no recent Dutch studies on ethnic selectivity (see
[43]), but in a review of older studies, Junger-Tas ([44], p. 292), concluded that
there is limited evidence for selectivity among police and that Bdifferential stop-
and-search procedures did not result in greater arrests of minority members
compared to Dutch citizens^. In any event, ethnic selectivity is less of a method-
ological concern here. Contrary to a significant part of the existing (quantitative)
studies in the field of migration and crime (see for example [41, 45–52]) we do
not compare immigrants with non-immigrants, nor are we primarily interested in
understanding differences in crime among different ethnic minorities (we only use
national origin as a control variable). There is nonetheless a possibility that the
police focused more on unauthorized immigrants and asylum seekers in the
procedure than on naturalized citizens and residence permit holders. (On the
tendency of police to focus on relatively marginal groups, see [53].)
Findings
Bivariate analyses
Table 2 presents suspect rates for 2004 by civic status on 1 February 2005,
specified for seven types of crime. Substantial differences between the various
civic categories can be observed, from 8.9% among the estimated unauthorized
population down to 2.8% among naturalized immigrants. Residence permit
Table 2 2004 Suspect rates by civic status for different types of crime
Naturalized Res. permit In procedure Unauthorized γ
Population 24,091 48,931 32,778 24,000a
Crime Suspects 674 1832 1734 2136
Suspect rates:
Any crime 2.8% 3.7% 5.3% 8.9% −0.31
Property crime 0.9% 1.4% 2.5% 4.4% −0.40
Drugs 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.4% −0.35
ID fraud 0.2% 0.3% 0.6% 1.5% −0.55
Violenceb 1.0% 1.2% 1.5% 2.1% −0.19
Public order 0.5% 0.7% 0.9% 1.5% −0.28
Traffic crimes 0.5% 0.6% 0.3% 0.5% 0.10
Other crimes 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.5% −0.27
a Estimation
b Theft with violence is categorized under ‘property crime’
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holders (3.7%) and those in the procedure (5.4%) held intermediate positions.
(The suspect rate among naturalized citizens is similar to the rate among native
born Dutch citizens).
As expected under hypotheses 1, the higher the civic status, the lower the
suspect rate. For all types of crime combined, there is a moderately strong ordinal
association between civic status and being a crime suspect or not (this has been
quantified by means of the gamma statistic for ordinal associations: γ = −0.31).
The suspect rate is significantly lower among naturalized migrants than among
residence permit holders, which confirms hypothesis 3.
As expected under hypothesis 2, the degree to which suspect rates differ by
civic status depends on the type of crime: the association between civic status and
crime is considerably stronger for ID fraud (γ = −0.55), property crimes γ = −0.40)
and drug crimes (γ = −0.35) than for violence (γ = −0.19), public order crimes
(γ = −0.28), and the category other crimes (γ = −0.27). Also note that differences
in type of offending are especially marked when status groups with substantively
different rights are compared. This constitutes additional support that the differ-
ences in offending between the two ‘highest’ civic statuses – naturalized migrants
and residence permit holders have similar economic and social rights – are mostly
due to selection effects rather than differential exposure to conditions affecting
criminal behavior.
Contrary to expectations, we find that traffic crimes – consisting mostly of
offences such as drunk driving and culpable accidents with casualties – are
somewhat more prevalent among naturalized immigrants and permit holders
than among asylum seekers in the procedure and unauthorized immigrants
(γ = 0.10). The reason may be that migrants with disadvantaged civic statuses
may not have a car to commit these offences. Additionally, such ‘expressive’
crimes neither generate income nor help create the impression of legal stay, but
mostly increase deportation risks.
The question can be raised of whether the population estimate for the category
of unauthorized immigrants (N = 24,000) could be too low, as that would bias its
suspect rate upwards, possibly leading to an incorrect acceptance of hypothesis 1.
However, by calculating ‘conservative’ suspect rates for those who applied in
2004 and had exhausted all legal remedies by February 1st 2005, it could be
established that the measured suspect rate of 8.9% is unlikely to be too high.11
11 We calculated conservative suspect rates for 12 ‘month cohorts’ among rejected asylum seekers who had
applied in 2004. These rates are based on the conservative assumption that all these applicants were in the
country without legal status throughout 2004 (even if all of them had legal stay as asylum seeker for at least
part of the year, and even if part of them arrived midway 2004 and/or left before January 2005). The rates vary
between 6.8% and 18.6%. They peak at 18.6% among those who applied for asylum in April 2004, and the
6.8% rate is found for those who applied in December 2004 while individuals in that month cohort only had a
month or less to become a suspect of a crime committed in 2004, unless they were in the country before
applying for asylum (we do not know the exact dates of the crimes). If we conservatively assume that this
6.8% was completely due to unauthorized migrants applying for asylum after having come to the attention of
the authorities as a crime suspect, the annual suspect rate for crimes committed after the asylum application
must have been 10% or more (18.6%–6.8%)), which is actually somewhat higher than the estimated rate of
8.9% presented in Table 2.
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Multivariate analyses
Table 3 presents three logistic regression models.12 For persons registered as a
crime suspect in 2004 the dependent variable is coded as 1, against 0 for persons
who were not a crime suspect for that year. The unauthorized category pertains to
the population estimate of 24,000. The first model predicts the probability of
being a crime suspect in 2004 by civic status only. Compared to being naturalized,
having a residence permit increases the odds of being registered as a crime suspect
by 1.35, meaning that the odds of being a crime suspect was 1.35 times higher for
permit holders than for naturalized immigrants. Compared to being naturalized,
being ‘in the procedure’ and being ‘unauthorized’ is associated with a 1.94 and
3.39 higher odds respectively. This basically demonstrates the same as Table 2: the
probability of being suspected in 2004 is lowest among naturalized immigrants
and highest among unauthorized asylum seekers.
The second model tests hypothesis 4 by adding a dummy variable that assigns a
1 to all individuals whom the state explicitly wished to exclude from a residence
12 Some caution is in order when comparing logistic models containing different independent variables (cf.
[54]). When models predict observed values better (as is the case here), the size of coefficients tends to
increase. To some extent, this masks the reduction of the coefficients of civic status after including statistical
controls. Mood suggests calculating Y-standardization as a (partial) solution to this problem. That did not lead
to substantively different conclusions, and we decided not to report Y-standardized coefficients.
Table 3 Effects (odds ratio’s) of civic status and migrant characteristics on being a crime suspect in 2004
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant 0.03 0.03 0.01
Civic status
Naturalized (ref.)
Residence permit 1.35** 1.34** 1.15**
In procedure 1.94** 1.85** 1.44**
Unauthorized 3.39* 3.29** 2.41**
Control variables
Public safety considerations 3.32** 3.23**
Sex (female = ref.) 3.61**
Age between 12 and 17 (ref.)
Age between 18 and 24 1.48**
Age between 25 and 44 0.82**
Age 45+ 0.40**
Lives in (unbroken) family 0.84**
Asian (incl. Turkey) (ref.)
Eastern European 1.58**
North African 1.96**
Sub-Saharan African 1.37**
Model χ2 1105.53 1306.33 4006.42
χ2 change 1105.53** 200.80** 2697.56**
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permit on the grounds of public safety considerations. This includes persons who
were declared ‘undesirable aliens’ as well as individuals whose asylum claims
were rejected on the grounds of public safety considerations. It turns out that
about 1% (N = 2495) of all migrants who applied for asylum in the period 1995–
2003 satisfy one or both of these conditions. Of these, 1334 are estimated to have
been residing in The Netherlands in 2004.13 Given these relatively low numbers, it
is unlikely that the aforementioned forms of selective status allocation and crim-
inalization have been very influential. The role of selective criminalization turns
out to have been modest in particular, as only 113 ‘undesired aliens’ were crime
suspects in 2004, of whom only 23 were merely suspected of a public order crime
(the category that includes the ‘crime’ of continued stay) without any other crimes.
Indeed, the association between civic status and crime persists as a result of this
control, leading us to reject hypothesis 4. At the same time, the differences in
suspect rates between, on the one hand, unauthorized immigrants and naturalized
immigrants and, on the other hand, permit holders and naturalized migrants do
become smaller. For example, the odds ratio for being an unauthorized immigrant
goes down from 3.39 (model 1) to 3.29 (model 2).
Model 3 estimates the effect of civic status if the four civic status groups
(naturalized, residence permit, in procedure, unauthorized) were identical in terms
of sex, age, family status, and region of origin. As expected, registered offending
is higher for males than for females (odds ratio = 3.62), and lower for those living
with a partner or two parents compared to singles or those living with one parent
(odds ratio = 0.84). Furthermore, there is a curvilinear relationship between age
and offending, with young adults (ages 18–24) having the highest chances of
being registered as a crime suspect. Finally, Asians have lower suspect rates than
Africans and Eastern Europeans. This final control leads us to conclude that the
more latent forms of filtering out newcomers with elevated crime risks were more
influential in bringing about the association between civic status and crime than
the explicit governmental efforts to socially exclude (suspected) ‘criminals’: the
association between civic status and crime becomes substantially weaker in model
3. At the same time, the effect of civic status clearly persists, and hypothesis 5 is
rejected. For example, the odds of being a crime suspect as a migrant ‘in the
procedure’ compared to naturalized immigrants is still 1.45, while having unau-
thorized status is associated with a 2.44 higher odds of being a crime suspect (for
the 2004 cohort: 2.88).
As a final step, we examined whether similar patterns hold for different types of
crimes by running the first and final model for each of the seven crimes (see Table 4;
in order to save space, the coefficients of the control variables and the models’
constants are not reported.) For each type of crime, civic status is a relevant predictor
of being a crime suspect or not, both before and after indicators of selective status
allocation and criminalization are controlled. In line with hypothesis 2, we find that
the remaining effects are the strongest for crimes that, more than other crimes, can be
seen as behavioral responses to the strains of having a disadvantaged civic status.
13 We assumed that those among the 2495 who were not suspected of a crime in 2004 had similar chances of
being in the country in 2004 as all other individuals in our database lacking legal stay on that date (see note
10).
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Being unauthorized, for example, is still associated with a 6.09 higher odds of being
suspected of ID fraud. But the effects of civic status are not limited to ID fraud: being
‘in the procedure’, for instance, is still associated with a 1.97 higher odds of being
suspected of a property crime, and being unauthorized is still associated with a 2.95
higher odds of being a drug crime suspect.
Table 4 Effects of civic status (odds ratios) on different crimes before and after controls
Model 1 Model 3
Property crime
Naturalized (ref.)
Residence permit 1.51** 1.26**
In procedure 2.75** 1.97**
Unauthorized 4.83** 3.28**
ID fraud
Naturalized (ref.)
Residence permit 1.66** 1.29
In procedure 3.55** 2.34**
Unauthorized 9.43** 6.09**
Drugs
Naturalized (ref.)
Residence permit 2.53** 1.93*
In procedure 2.55** 1.61
Unauthorized 5.95** 2.95**
Violence
Naturalized (ref.)
Residence permit 1.29** 1.18*
In procedure 1.57** 1.29**
Unauthorized 2.20** 1.75**
Public order
Naturalized (ref.)
Residence permit 1.42 1.21
In procedure 2.01** 1.38**
Unauthorized 3.13 2.13**
Traffic crime
Naturalized (ref.)
Residence permit 1.21 1.04
In procedure 0.65** 0.49**
Unauthorized 0.91 0.58**
Other crime
Naturalized (ref.)
Residence permit 1.21 1.02
In procedure 1.65** 1.21
Unauthorized 2.87** 1.94**
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Conclusion
This article analytically synthesizes the available literature on the relationship between
civic status and crime, and applies this integrated framework to asylum migrants in
The Netherlands. Underlying the analysis is the notion of ‘civic stratification’. In an
effort to manage immigration, governments create complex hierarchies of legal statuses
– here called: civic statuses – that are linked to specific economic, social and political
rights. A central assumption behind this study is that civic stratification is relevant to
understand crime patterns.
Under the system of civic stratification found in The Netherlands in 2004, natural-
ized immigrants and permit holders had a significantly lower probability of being
registered as a crime suspect than asylum seekers in the procedure and unauthorized
immigrants, and such differences were especially marked for property and drug
offences, and ID fraud. These outcomes suggest that civic status influences behavior
via the strain perspective, and confirm our first two hypotheses. Furthermore, the
suspect rate among naturalized migrants is found to be lower than among residence
permit holders, even if these categories have similar economic and social rights, leading
us to accept hypothesis 2. The association between civic status and crime also becomes
weaker when indicators of selective status allocation are controlled. When we take into
consideration whether or not asylum migrants were rejected because of public safety
considerations, or lost their residence permit because of criminal convictions, the
differences in suspect rates become smaller, although the association between civic
status and crime persists, leading us to reject hypothesis 4. The effects of civic status on
crime also become smaller, but still persist, when various individual characteristics are
controlled that are generally seen as risk factors for criminal behavior, leading us to
reject hypothesis 5. In spite of rejecting hypotheses 4 and 5, our main claim is
nonetheless that a combination of perspectives is required in order to understand the
complex relationship between civic stratification and crime. Civic stratification struc-
tures behavior, including behavior that is punishable, but civic statuses are not allocated
at random (in part because the tendencies towards civic stratification in Lockwood's
[2] sense will put certain groups at a disadvantage in admission decisions), and certain
migration behavior is selectively criminalized.
Evidently, the findings regarding the unauthorized population need to be taken with
caution, as we had to rely on statistical estimates to assess its size. However, we obtained
similar results for those who applied for asylum in 2004 and had exhausted all legal
remedies by February 2005, when making the conservative assumption that all individ-
uals in this category were in the country as unauthorized immigrants throughout 2004.
We contend that strain theory is essential in order to understand the relationship
between civic status and crime; it is especially useful to explain the association between
civic status and property crime, ID fraud and drug crimes. We do not claim, however,
that all relevant processes and mechanisms have been taken into consideration in the
present analyses. Additional theoretical elaborations are possible, for example, which
similarly depart from the notion that civic status influences individual behavior. For
instance, the finding that migrants with the two ‘lowest’ civic statuses were consider-
ably underrepresented with regard to traffic crime suggests that civic status may
structure the opportunities to commit certain offences (compare [55] notion of a
‘differential opportunity structure’). Likewise, differential access to employment as a
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result of civic stratification may contribute to differences in informal control.14 There is
a strong current in life course criminology that argues that unemployment attenuates
informal social control, which in turn increases criminal activity (cf. [56, 57]). Such
theoretical elaborations are all similar to our application of strain theory in one
important respect: they are varieties of what Ritzer [58] has called the social facts
paradigm in sociology, as they all depart from the assumption that civic stratification is
a social fact that exerts power over individual behavior. They are all varieties of the
behavioral perspective.
Similarly, we may not have included in the analysis all mechanisms that are
informed by a constructionist stance. Additional aspects of social sorting may play a
role in status allocation decisions, and part of the remaining effects of civic status could
be due to the unobserved effects of social class, for example. The UNHRC Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees defines refugees as those fleeing persecution for
various reasons, including political opinion. If higher educated asylum seekers more
often flee because of political activism, or when they are more successful in convincing
immigration officials that they deserve protection, they will end up in higher civic
statuses than lower educated asylum seekers, potentially contributing to a spurious
relationship between civic status and crime. Future research could explore such addi-
tional mediating mechanisms and sorting processes, ideally by using longitudinal data,
allowing researchers to examine the effects of changes in civic status on criminal
behavior. Should the analysis be limited to legally staying migrants, it may also be
possible to obtain direct measurements of relevant mechanisms via a survey.
A final point of discussion relates to the generalizability of our outcomes. The first
question is its generalizability in time. As we use data from the period 1995–2004, one
could ask whether our findings still apply today. Is a low civic status still associated
with a higher propensity of criminal activity? Does criminal behavior still limit the
changes of migrants obtaining a higher civic status? We would argue that our findings
are likely to still hold as the Dutch system of civic stratification has not changed
fundamentally. For example, the policies limiting asylum seekers’ and unauthorized
immigrants’ access to the labor market and social provisions are still in place. In fact,
paying attention to civic stratification has probably become even more important than it
already was: tendencies to selectively criminalize and exclude ‘unwanted’ immigrants –
both unauthorized immigrants and residence permit holders with a criminal record –
have become stronger in the post 2004 period, as they have elsewhere in Europe and
the United States (cf. [59, 60]).15
14 Only residence permit holders and naturalized migrants are entitled to family reunification. Hence part of
the effect of family status on crime could be seen as an indirect effect of civic status via the mediating
mechanism ‘informal social control’. We decided to treat family status as a confounding factor in relation to
selective status allocation because 79% of those who lived in a family in 2004 had applied on the same day,
and had not reunified at a later stage.
15 For example, after implementing the 2008 EU Return Directive in 2011, the Dutch government began to
systematically impose ‘entry bans’ on apprehended unauthorized immigrants. The Netherlands chose to
criminalize continued residence while such a ban is in force as a misdemeanour (or a felony if the person
received the ban due to a criminal record), which is punishable by a maximum of six months of detention or a
fine of up to €3900 (€7800 in case of an entry ban because of a criminal record). In 2012 it was also made
easier to terminate the residence permit of non-citizens who have been convicted of certain crimes. The most
important change was that resident permit holders with relatively short residence durations also became at risk
of losing their losing the permit in case of relatively minor crimes [17].
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While the importance of selective status allocation and criminalization has probably
increased, the influence of strain may have diminished to some extent. Asylum seekers in
the procedure may nowwork 24 instead of 12 weeks a year, and the Dutch government has
also been successful in shortening the asylum procedure, thereby limiting the time asylum
seekers live under deprived conditions in reception centers (the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’
changed this again due to capacity problems). Additionally, since 2011, unauthorized
families with children under the age of 18 have a right to an elementary ‘bed, bath and
bread’ arrangement in what are called Family Locations (Gezinslocaties), which now
accommodate about 2000 persons (the families have to report regularly to the immigration
authorities and are still at risk of being deported) [31]. In the near future, the pressure to
offend may similarly diminish to some extent for unauthorized immigrants without chil-
dren: in November 2014, the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) decided that
The Netherlands should grant all unauthorized immigrants a right to basic (night) shelter.16
The other question is whether the Dutch case is generalizable to other countries. For
two reasons, we think that this is generally the case. First, The Netherlands is not an
extraordinary case since all Western countries regulate immigration by applying dif-
ferent social, economic and residence rights to immigrants who are more or less
welcome – with more or less comparable systems of civic stratification as a result.
Second, there actually seems to have been a certain shift in the direction of the Dutch
case; for instance, both in Europe and the USA, there has been a tendency toward
stricter policy approaches to unauthorized migrants, which include stepped-up efforts to
exclude the latter from labor markets, social provisions, and housing [9, 12, 17, 61–65].
This is not to say, of course, that there will not be significant differences between
countries. In less comprehensive welfare states, such as the United States, a ‘high’ civic
status will bring fewer social rights than in The Netherlands, and may be less of a real
privilege. There will also be countries with more work opportunities in the informal sector
cushioning the potential negative consequences of being accorded a ‘low’ civic status.17 In
such contexts, there will be smaller differences between civic status categories than in
TheNetherlands, which combinesmore advanced social protection systemswith a relatively
small informal economy, thus leaving fewer opportunities to compensate for a lower civic
status with informal work, and amplifying the potential behavioral effects of civic stratifi-
cation. Finally, there is variation in the degree to which migrants with weaker civic statuses
are incorporated by established ethnic communities, thereby protecting the former from the
most extreme forms of marginality. Compared to Europe, the United States has low levels of
asylum seekers. Most of its unauthorized immigrants are not former asylum seekers, but
labour or family migrants, most of whom – about 60% (cf. [67]) – are estimated to be from
Mexico, which has been a major source country of immigration to the US for a long time.
In conclusion
In several European countries, as well as in Australia and the United States, there have
been media reports about crime and other forms of assumed deviance among asylum
16 See complaint number 90/2013, Conference of European Churches versus The Netherlands. In 2015, the
government decided to facilitate six night shelters spread across the country. Access depends on the condition
that unauthorized migrants ‘cooperate’ with their departure.
17 The estimated relative size of the informal sector in The Netherlands is somewhat larger than in United
States, but smaller than in countries like Spain and Italy [66].
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migrants and unauthorized immigrants, which have been used by politicians to argue for
more restrictive admission policies (cf. [68–70]). The present analysis shows that an
opposite logic could also be followed: it suggests that social exclusion actually contributes
to certain crime issues, and that the chances of such issues occurring decrease when asylum
migrants are more fully integrated, i.e., given similar rights as citizens, rather than being
excluded. This message is especially important in a time when asylum applications are
again on the rise in most countries of the Global North. While a certain degree of civic
stratification is inevitable, especially in a global order that is marked by considerable
international inequality, this does not take away the obligation on the part of states to invest
in good and fair asylum procedures (thus reducing the number of asylum seekers who have
good reasons to overstay a rejection), and to guarantee certain minimum rights for those at
the bottom of the civic hierarchy. Seen in that light, decisions such as by the ECSR seem to
represent a welcoming counterforce against civic stratification pushed too far.
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